



FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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DE-INDUSTRIALIZATION OF GERMANY—A DEFEATIST POLICY

WHEN Mr. Churchill, in his address of September 28 to the House of Commons, warned that victory in Europe might be delayed until 1945, he was merely confirming the conclusion already reached by the public when Allied forces did not succeed in developing an operation intended to turn the Siegfried Line. We are now entering the most critical phase of the critical years in which it is our fate to live—the phase which will decide not merely whether we can achieve military victory over Germany, but also moral victory over the ideas and practices of Nazism. That is why it is imperative that the Allies do everything in their power not only to encourage among the liberated peoples a belief in democracy, but to foster among the Germans a state of mind favorable to surrender. Are the Germans in a mood for surrender?

This question cannot be answered with any more assurance than the question of when the war in Europe may be expected to end, and for the same reason. Because no one—either German or non-German—knows with any degree of certainty how non-military factors, such as fatigue, disgust, despair or hope for improvement if war ceased, may operate on masses of people who for nearly twelve years have had no opportunity to express themselves freely. No responsible person has the right to be dogmatic on this subject. Certain practical considerations, however, can be weighed in discussing our treatment of Germany, which has aroused a serious, but legitimate, difference of opinion both in the Roosevelt cabinet and in the European Advisory Commission in London.

WHAT DOES UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER MEAN? The Allies are right to maintain unchanged their position that the Germans must accept unconditional surrender. It is conceivable that, if we accepted German surrender on certain conditions, we might obtain it at an earlier date, with resulting

saving of lives. But, in the long run, such surrender would have been bought at a high cost, for it might hasten the coming of other conflicts, with eventual loss of life greater than that required to win a decisive admission of defeat from the Germans. Any conditions we might formulate before the Germans lay down their arms might prove unfulfillable once we learn the existing state of things in Germany. Then our failure to fulfill such conditions would furnish dissatisfied Germans with a powerful weapon of propaganda—just as the alleged nonfulfillment of certain of President Wilson's Fourteen Points helped Hitler to bolster his case.

But the term "unconditional surrender" presumably applies solely to the military termination of hostilities. Once surrender has taken place, our treatment of Germany—whether "hard" or "soft"—will be dictated by many considerations other than those that are purely military. On this point some confusion appears to exist in the minds of certain United Nations spokesmen, who give the impression that the necessarily unyielding character of military surrender will become part and parcel of the terms then imposed on Germany. If we intend to influence the Germans to accept unconditional surrender, it would seem essential, as a matter of psychological warfare, to draw a distinction between the military stage and that which will set in once the Germans have laid down their arms.

This distinction should be made, whatever may be our estimate of conditions within Germany. The question is often debated whether there are two Germanys. Most likely there are 57 varieties of Germans—all swayed by different personal likes and dislikes. What concerns us is that the 57 varieties seemed finally to be united on the same program of national military expansion. We shall get nowhere trying to figure out the percentage of anti-Nazis we may find when Hitler is overthrown. The Gestapo may know

—but its job, obviously, is to destroy those who can be so classified, and the more we try to identify publicly the Germans who are anti-Nazi, the more we help the Gestapo, and thus weaken the very elements in Germany who might eventually be helpful to the United Nations. Our program toward Germany should be planned in such a way as to apply to any kind of Germany that may emerge out of the war—whether 100 per cent pro- or 100 per cent anti-Nazi.

If the United Nations could reach agreement among themselves on some of the fundamental issues now under debate, many of the questions concerning Germany could be viewed, and decided, in clearer perspective. It has been said on several occasions during this war that the world cannot survive half-slave and half-free. Neither can we expect, over the long haul, to have one kind of world in Germany, and another outside. If we believe German militarism can be destroyed by breaking up Junker estates in East Prussia, can we oppose similar measures, let us say in Poland or Hungary? If we think that what Germany needs is a thoroughgoing revolution that would sweep out the Junkers and the big industrialists who supported Hitler, can we oppose or fear far-reaching social and economic changes in countries now fighting on our side against Fascism and Nazism? And, conversely, if we fear revolutions in liberated countries, shall we be equally fearful of internal changes in Germany?

INDUSTRY ALONE DOES NOT CAUSE WAR. Our own inner indecision is strikingly reflected in the proposals made concerning Germany's economic future. Those who advocate the destruction of German industry and the transformation of Germany into a purely agricultural community apparently assume that wars start because certain nations have the industrial wherewithal to wage war. This illusion is even more dangerous than the illusion of the inter-war years that the mere sinking of fleets after the Washington Conference of 1921 or the signing of the Kellogg-Briand pact would bring about eternal peace. If the assumption about the military dangers of industry is correct, then we should proceed to destroy all industry everywhere.

Such an assumption reveals unmitigated defeatism

concerning the capacity of human beings to control industrial civilization. Instead of destroying German industry, should we not ask ourselves whether it can be used constructively if it is controlled by democratic committees of managers, technicians and workers, as proposed for France? This would not prevent the United Nations from imposing controls on certain key industries in Germany which are primarily useful for war—such as synthetic oil, airplanes, aluminum ingots, and so on. To make a clean sweep of all German industry would be to deprive millions of Germans of the opportunity to make a livelihood. We may think this serves the Germans right and is no concern of ours. But it would be, if millions of unemployed Germans produced a social explosion in Europe. The only reason for taking all industry from Germany might be doubt as to the United Nations' capacity to prevent resurgence of German militarism. But if such doubt exists now, before the war is over, what assurance is there that the United Nations will act in unison to de-industrialize Germany?

The German menace in 1939 was not in the factories of Germany, but in the minds of Germans who saw profit and prestige in militarism and expansion, and in the indifference of the Western powers to the political implications of Nazism. The fact that the Germans behaved with a bestiality and a cunning unequaled in modern history should not blind us to the fact that, at another time, other peoples may be swayed by similar considerations to resort to war. That is why it is so urgently important to distinguish clearly between two tasks which, if confused, will both remain unaccomplished. One task is to make the Germans aware of their responsibility for the acts of terror and brutality perpetrated by them, or in their name, during this war. For this task many measures are appropriate: among them are Allied military occupation of Germany, its duration to be determined by the degree of German collaboration with the Allies and by the international situation in general; United Nations direction of German industries, with a view to assuring the rehabilitation of liberated countries; elimination or control of certain industries used primarily for war, as indicated above; complete disarmament; punishment of individuals who ordered or condoned acts of brutality. But even if all these measures are strictly applied over a long period of time, we shall have only scratched the surface of the problem of security in Europe unless we address ourselves to the second task: and that is the creation of a system of international collaboration, based on continuous consultation and backed by the possibility of prompt resort to force if necessary, through which we might gradually—and, we must expect, with many setbacks—alleviate the political, economic and social conflicts and frictions that lead to war.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

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WAR ACCENTUATES OPIUM DANGER

The danger of widespread drug addiction among the war-shocked populations of Europe is emphasized by a recent article in the British medical journal *Lancet*, which warns doctors against indiscriminate prescription of sedatives to patients who have been bombed out, as well as against giving "such instructions as would enable the patients to take drugs whenever they feel they need it." The need of sedatives for civilian sufferers has increased as civilian bombing spreads over ever-widening areas. Military casualties also have become accustomed to the relief of morphine.

THREE STAGES OF CONTROL. The Permanent Central Opium Board, established by treaties negotiated in Geneva in 1925 and 1931, called attention to this problem in liberated countries at its meeting in London on April 27, 1944, and reiterated this warning at its July meeting held under the rain of robot bombs which punctuated its recommendations. The Board sees three stages for which provision will be necessary. During the first stage, military occupation, all drugs in civilian hands should be reported and placed under control. Relief organizations will require licenses for import for civilian use; such supplies will be issued only on medical prescriptions checked by periodic reports. All factories will be controlled and no new ones licensed except upon proof of need.

Control in the second and third stages should develop out of measures taken during military occupation, and lead to a system of national and international control, conforming to the 1925 and 1931 conventions. H. J. Anslinger, Commissioner of Narcotics, and Herbert L. May, Vice President of the P.C.O.B., member of the Foreign Policy Association Opium Research Committee, have already prepared for this stage through lectures at the University of Virginia and at Columbia to Army and Navy officers training as administrators for liberated areas both in Europe and in the Pacific. Directives have been issued for military commanders to be applied immediately on occupation. Experienced narcotic officers have been commissioned and assigned to military forces. Recently one of these Army officers has been coordinating plans in London with British military authorities, using the suggestions in the April report of the Permanent Central Opium Board as a basis for the immediate administrative controls in European liberated areas. The importance of similar measures for southeastern Europe, Africa, the Middle

and Far East was emphasized at the July meeting of the Board.

SCOPE OF DANGER. International action is the only answer to a danger which ignores national boundaries. Military authorities must now take their place in the international control machinery. American public opinion should be informed as to the action currently taken in Italy, for instance, and in North Africa. It would also be useful to know what is being done to prevent the spread of drug addiction among our own troops, and to control the illicit traffic into the American market which, because of its high prices, is the ultimate goal of all large smuggling rings.

In June 1944 the Swedish international police radio broadcast the theft in Belgium of enough morphine and codeine to supply the legitimate medical needs of that entire country for a year. The retail value of the stolen narcotics at present prices in the illicit market in the United States approximates \$17,000,000. A theft on such a scale proves not only the venality of the "incorruptible Nazi officials," but indicates that a well-organized, well-financed smuggling group is still functioning. The purchase and distribution of such a quantity of narcotics could not be handled by the methods of the retail drug peddler. This proves the necessity for immediate action by the military authorities on the lines recommended by the Board.

The aroused interest of the American public is the best insurance that the peril will be recognized and measures, necessarily international in scope, taken to keep this control machinery functioning during the war as successfully as it has in peace.

HELEN HOWELL MOORHEAD

ANNUAL FORUM

In addition to the speakers announced for the all-day F.P.A. Forum to be held on Saturday, October 7, at The Waldorf-Astoria on the theme, "Program for Security," there will be a showing at two o'clock of the film, "What To Do With Germany," through the courtesy of THE MARCH OF TIME. Dr. Conant will speak on "The Effective Disarmament of Germany and Japan" at 1:30 p.m.


Germany Will Try It Again, by Sigrid Schultz. New York, Reynal and Hitchcock, 1944. \$2.50

With heated conviction the author, after long years of journalistic work in Germany, stresses her belief that it must be made impossible for the Germans to start another world war.

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Washington News Letter



PLANS FOR SECURITY ORGANIZATION HINGE ON U.S. ELECTIONS

The task of fashioning a plan acceptable to all the United Nations out of the discussion and exchanges taking place at Dumbarton Oaks rests now with President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. In his address to the House of Commons on September 28, Mr. Churchill expressed the hope that the three men might meet "before the end of the year." Better than their diplomatic representatives, they could bring about the agreement on a security system that Dumbarton Oaks has been unable fully to achieve, and prepare the way for united decision by a formal conference of all the United Nations. (The United States would like to see such a conference convoked this fall.) Yet even the Big Three leaders would face barriers to agreement if they met before our Presidential elections and before the Allies have resolved their differences over Poland, which have once more become acute.

POLISH ISSUE DISTURBS ALLIES. Until the November 7 elections have clarified the future course of American foreign policy, Britain, Russia and China are not certain whether this country will support active international collaboration after the war. And, meanwhile, uncertainty as to whether the Western powers will try to isolate Russia in the future as they did in 1919 still inhibits Moscow. The focus of Russia's doubts is Poland, for while the United States and Britain recognize the Polish government in London, the U.S.S.R., having broken off diplomatic relations with that government, deals with the Polish Committee of National Liberation in Lublin. Mr. Churchill on September 28 said: "I trust that the Soviet government will make it possible for us to act unitedly with them in this solution of the Polish problems." The Polish government removed one of the obstacles to united action on September 29 by dropping General Kazimierz Sosnkowski—who had been a particular target of Russian criticism—as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. His replacement by General Tadeusz Komorowski (known as General Bor), who commanded the ill-fated Warsaw uprising against the Germans, however, has precipitated another crisis. For the new commander-in-chief is accused by the Lublin Committee and by Moscow of "criminally" ordering the uprising at a time when the Russians could give no effective aid to the Poles in Warsaw.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AFTER NOV. 7? United States voters this year will elect a President,

a new House of Representatives and 32 Senators. Britain, Russia and China gain little by coming to an understanding today with the administration of President Roosevelt so long as they do not know whether he or Gov. Thomas E. Dewey will win the election. Although Governor Dewey in a speech at Louisville on September 8 endorsed the principle of collective security, the election of isolationists or "reservationists" to other offices could frustrate his or Mr. Roosevelt's efforts to translate the principle into practice. On September 28 Senator Joseph H. Ball, Republican of Minnesota, a strong proponent of international political action for the United States, warned that "the character and convictions of the Congressmen that the people elect on November 7 will determine the way we go" in overseas affairs.

Under the shadow of these uncertainties, the delegates at Dumbarton Oaks have declined to commit themselves to a firm and detailed security scheme. When, on September 29, the first phase of the discussions ended with the departure of the Soviet delegation to make way for that of China, the conferees remained deadlocked on one major point. The Russians, fearing to be outvoted by the Western powers, favored granting to each member of the council of the projected international security organization the right to veto proposals for action in international disputes involving a council member, while the Americans and British advocated control of the council's action by majority vote. The Chinese, who stand with the United States and Britain, have proposed that a council member involved in a dispute refrain from voting.

CHURCHILL CAUTIONS AGAINST HASTE. Aware of the historical apprehension which disturbs the Russians, Prime Minister Churchill told the House of Commons on September 28: "We ought not to be hurried into decisions upon which united opinion by the various governments responsible is not at present ripe." One explanation of his advocacy of going slow is that both Britain and Russia want the territorial rearrangements made at the close of the war to be exempted from re-examination by the international security organization. The United States is inclined to accept this limitation, but advocates the development of a security program, in however skeletal a form, in time for presentation to the United States Congress this winter.

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